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Id. -Family Allowance- Persons Entitled- Widow.-Ordinarily the widow establishes a prima facie case for a family
allowance by showing that the marriage relation continued
until the time of her husband's death, and she is not reqmred
to allege and prove that there were no circumstances by which
she lost the right of support ordinarily inherent in her position
as a wife.
Id.- Family Allowance- Persons Entitled- Widow.- The
widow's right to a family allowance is not ordinarily lost
merely because the spouses were living apart at the time the
husband died or because she had been supporting herself without financial aid from the husband.
!d.-Family Allowance-Persons Entitled-Widow.-Though
a wife, under the terms of a support decree, was not receiving
support payments from her husband at the time of his death,
and she could have sought modification of that decree during
his lifetime if she could have shown sufficiently changed circumstances occurring before the death, his death should not
prevent her from thereafter seeking a family allowance based
on changed circumstances occurring before his death, nor
should she be penalized for not seeking modification of the
decree during his last illness: if the probate court should find
on competent evidence that cireumstances had changed sufficiently so that the support decree could have been modified
during the husband's lifetime to provide further support and
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to vacate such orders for
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SPENCE, J.-American Trust Company, special administrator of the above estate, appeals from two orders granting
a family allowance of $1,000 a month to Margaret Fallon,
widow of the deceased, and from an order refusing to vacate
these orders for family allowance. [1] The order denying
the petition to vacate the order granting a family allowance
is not an appealable order. (Prob. Code, § 1240.) The appeal from that order will therefore be dismissed. (Estate of
Caldwell, 67 Cal.App.2d 652 [155 P.2d 380] .)
The administrator attacks the propriety of the award of a
family allowance to the widow under the particular circumstances of this case. The record sustains its position, and
the orders granting such allowance must be reversed.
Frederick Arthur Fallon died on November 18, 1955,
aged approximately 86. Shortly thereafter the trust company
filed its petition for the probate of his will. On December 15,
1955, the widow filed her verified petition for a family allowance, seeking $2,500 per month. She claimed that the estate
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had a value in excess of $600,000 and that its monthly income
was adequate to pay the allowance she sought.
At the hearing it appeared that she and deceased had mar
ried in 1940 and bad filed reciprocal divorce actions in 1945
Both parties were denied divorces but the court awarded
Mrs. Fallon support of $250 a month for one year only. Thi~
decree was affirmed on appeal. (Fallon v. Fallon, 83 Cal
App.2d 798 [189 P.2d 7661.) The husband made the ordered
payments for the one year and then stopped. Some seven
years elapsed before the husband's death, during which time
Mrs. Fallon moved to British Columbia and received no further payments from him.
On December 22, 1955, the court granted the widow a
family allowance of $1,000 per month. On December 29,
1955, the court, on the trust company's petition, appointed
it special administrator of the estate. On January 4, 1956.
the court filed a second order identical to its previous order
granting the widow the $1,000 monthly family allowance.
Thereafter the special administrator filed its petition seeking
vacation of the orders granting the family allowance. It
alleged that because of the previous divorce proceedings
(Fallon v. Fallon, supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 798) the widow was
not entitled to a family allowance. [t also alleged that, as
guardian of the deceased's estate, it had filed an inventory on
December 6, 1955, showing assets of some $337,000 and income
for 1955 of less than $10,000. After a hearing this petition
was denied.
[2] The right of a wife to a family allowance is conditioned
rrpon her right to support at the time of her husband's death
(Estate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724].) [3] Ordinarily the wife establishes a prima facie case for an allowance
by showing that the marriage relation continued until the
time of her husband's death. She is not required to allege and
prove that there were no circumstances by which she lost
this right to support, which is ordinarily inherent in her
position as a wife. [4] Nor is the right ordinarily lost
merely because the spouses were living apart at the time that
the husband died or because the wife had been supporting
herself without financial aid from the husband. (Estate of
Coons, 107 Cal.App.2d 531. 536 [237 P.2d 291]; see 34
A.L.R.2d 1056.) The effect of the award for the wife's support
for a limited period, which expired before the husband's
death, however, is an additional circumstance which must be
considered here.

Nov.l957]
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In Estate of Brooks, supra, 28 Cal.2d 748, the wife
had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce which made
no provision for her support. While the marriage continues
until the final decree, an "interlocutory judgment of divorce
is . . . so far as it determines the rights of the parties. a
eontract between them . . . . Until that contract is in some
manner changed, either in the action or in somE' independent
proceeding, or by a recom·iliation. her right to support is
-;uspended." (London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com ..
181 CaL 460, 465-467 [ 184 P 864].)
This court in the Brooks case noted that the manifest purpose of the family allowance is "to continue during the settlement of the t>state, the support that the wife was previously
receiving or was at least entitled to receive." (28 Cal.2d at
p. 755.) Since the wife there was not entitled to support
under the divorce decree, the order granting a widow's allowance was reversed.
A situation more similar to the present case was involved in Monroe v. Superior Cou1·t, 28 Cal.2d 427 [170 P.2d
4731, where the wife had been granted separate maintenance
for only a limited period. After that period expired, sht>
sought a further allowance for her support. "alleging that
the circumstances upon which the decree was based had
materially changed." (28 Cal.2d at p. 428.) This court held
that additional support might be granted, although jurisdic·
tion to do so had not been reserved in the original decree, if
sufficiently changed circumstances were shown Relief could
be granted since a "separate maintenance decree does no1
end the marriage" nor "the obligation to support'' arising
from it, but "only regulates the extent of that support." ( 28
Cal.2d at p. 429.)
[5] While the wife here, under the terms of the support
decree, was not receiving support payment;; from her husband at the time of his death, she could have sought modification of that decree during his lifetime if she could have shown
sufficiently changed circumstances occurrmg before the death.
(Monroe v. Superwr Court, s1~pra. 28 Cal.2d 427; O'Toole v
O'Toole, 215 Cal. 441 [10 P.2d 461].) His death should no1
prevent her from thereafter seeking a family allowance based
on changed eircumstance~ occurring before his demise (see
ln re Nowell, 99 F 931) nor should she be penalized for not
seeking a modification of the dt>cree during his last illness. If
the probate court finds, upon competent evidence, that circumstances had changed sufficiently so that the support decree
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modified

the husband's lifetime to
was therefore entitled
at the time of the husband's
that court could
allowance for the widow after his

death.
reveals no evidence of such
before the death of the busthe widow that the fact that her
which he>

"'"·"'""'""' in his will bequeathing his widow
as evidence of his continued
toward her
their marital differences.
We therefore conclude that in the absence of evidence upon
which the probate court could have found that the widow was
entitled by reason of changed circumstances to support from
her husband at the time of his death there was no basis for
the granting of the family allowance.
The orders granting the
allowance are reversed. The
appeal from the order denying the petition to vacate said
orders for family allowance is dismissed. Appellant shall
recover costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
McComb,

concurred in the judgment.

CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion neither Estate of Brooks, 28 Ca1.2d 748 [171
P.2d 724], nor London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn.,
181 Cal. 460 [184 P. 864], announces a rule of law which may
be invoked to defeat the claim of Mrs. Fallon to a family
allowance here. Furthermore, this is not a Monroe case
(Monroe v. Superior Court, 28 CaL2d 427 [170 P.2d 473] ).
'l'here, an action for separate maintenance had been brought
by the wife, and after issue
had been tried and a
decree rendered which had become final. In that case the
trial court had entered a decree of separate maintenance
which contained no reservation of
as to property
and which
to be a final decree
and forever settle the reciprocal rights and obligations of the
It made
for support of a
minor child; it awarded to the wife as her sole and separate
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therein; it awarded to her
amount of
the husband for 27 months comand certain insurance which was
to be
in force
the husband for her benefit and that of
the child; it awarded the
as his sole and
a certain automobile. bank
and
bonds. It was my view as .ov'"""''""n'" in my disselltiUil' ~"·~·.~~ in that case
Cal.2d
that the decree
which had become
was res adjudicata on
the issues there
and I am still of that opinion.
actions for divorce were brought by both parties which
either party a divorce but
resulted in a judgment
awarded the wife $250 per month for her support for one
year pursuant to section 136 of the Civil Code. Unquestionably, either party could thereafter have brought another action for divorce based upon conduct of the other occurring
after the rendition of the former judgment, and the court
would have had jurisdiction in such an action to make such
provision for the support and maintenance of either party
which the pleadings and evidence warranted. Such being the
law, the court here unquestionably has jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue of family allowance to the widow notwithstanding the former judgment denying a divorce to either
party. The effect of the prior judgment was not to determine
the right of the wife to support and maintenance for all time
as this issue was not litigated in the divorce action. It would
seem clear that if the wife was not entitled to a divorce in the
former actions, she was not entitled to permanent alimony or
separate maintenance. The allowance to her of $250 per
month for one year was only temporary and should not
deprive the court of jurisdiction to make a subsequent adjudication of this issue.
It must be obvious that if an award of separate maintenance
is made for a definite period, and becomes final, and the husband should die during such period, the award could not
thereafter be increased or extended, and an award of alimony
would terminate upon the husband's death (Hilton v. McNitt,
ante, p. 79 [315 P.2d 1]) with no power in a court to
modify it. Such is not the situation here, and it is my view
that the prior judgment in the divorce actions and the allowance of temporary support pursuant to section 136 of the
Civil Code in no way impedes the jurisdiction of the probate
court to determine what if any family allowance should be
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awarded to Mrs. Fallon in the probate proceedings on her
husband's estate. In other words, the court had jurisdiction
to hear all competent evidence relative to the status of the
parties prior to the death of the decedent and make an award
in favor of Mrs. Fallon for a family allowance if such an
award was justified by the evidence. In my opinion the trial
court was justified in making an award for a family allowance in favor of Mrs. Fallon and its order should, therefore,
be affirmed.
SHENK, J.-1 dissent. The majority opinion relies on
Bstate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724] and Monroe
v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.2d 427 1170 P.2d 473] as authority
for holding that where during marriage an order for maintenance and support has been made to the wife for a limited
period and no decree of divorce has been granted, a showing
of changed circumstances must thereafter be made as a necessary foundation for an award of a family allowance from the
estate of her deceased husband.
In Estate of Brooks, an interlocutory decree of divorce had
settled the property rights of the parties and terminated the
right to support. In the present case the widow's right to
support was not terminated by the 1945 support order. If she
had petitioned the court for additional support during Mr.
Fallon's lifetime, she might have obtained it, under the
holding of this court in the Monroe case, upon a showing of
changed circumstances and by modification of the order.
Upon Mr. Fallon's death, however, Mrs. Fallon was no longer
entitled to move for a modification of the prior support order.
(See Hilton v. McNitt, ante, p. 79 [315 P.2d 1]; Civ. Code,
§ 139. J Her right thereafter to any financial assistance resulting from the marital relationship became a preferential
statutory right under section 680 of the Probate Code which
provides that the widow is ". . . entitled to such reasonable
allowance out of the estate as shall be necessary for [her]
maintenance according to [her] circumstances, during the
progress of the settlement of the estate. . . . "
This court now requires the surviving widow to show, before
she may obtain a family allowance after the death of her
husband, such change of conditions as would entitle her to a
modification of a support order made during the lifetime of
her deceased husband. Such a requirement should relate only
to the distinct and separate remedy in a proceeding to modify
the support order made during the husband's lifetime.
The Brooks case should not be extended beyond a holding

Nov.l957]

PEOPLE v. McCAUGHAN
[49 C.2d 409: 317 P.2d 974]

409

that where the
to support has been terminated during
the lifetime of the husband no family allowance may be
granted from his estate. It is a sufficient showing to entitle
her to a family allowance that Mrs. Fallon's right to support
was not cut off by the expiration of the 1945 support order
The court now extends the Brooks and Monroe cases to reach
a result which is neither consonant with the holdings of those
cases nor with the direct terms and unquestioned spirit of
Probatf' Code. section 680 I would affirm the orders.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December
17, 1957. Shenk. ,J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[Crim. No. 6050.

In Bank.

Nov. 19, 1957.)

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VELVA IRENE
McCAUGHAN, Appellant.
[1] Statutes-Validity-Certainty.-A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common knowledge must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential
of due process of law.
[2] Criminal Law-Prohibition by Law-Sufficiency and Validity
of Enactment.-A statute must be definite enough to provide
a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed
as well as a standard for the ascertainment of guilt by the
courts called on to apply it.
[3] Statutes-Validity-Certainty.-A statute will be upheld if
its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to the
common law or to its legislative history or purpose.
[4] Id.-Validity-Certainty.-A statute will be upheld, despite
the fact that the acts it prohibits are defined in vague terms,
if it requires an adequately defined specific intent.
[1 J See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 36; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 382.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 13, 14, 100; Am.Jur.,
Criminal Law, § 19.
.McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Statutes, § 37; [2] Criminal
Law, § 9; [ 6-9, 11, 20] Insane Persons, § 51.5; [10] Statutes, § 36;
[12] Criminal Law, § 561(1); [13-15] Witnesses, § 27; [16] Witnesses, § 32; [17, 19] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [18] Criminal Law,
§ 393(1).

